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Abstract— Protecting  the  location  privacy  is  still  one  of 
the main  challenges  in  Vehicular  Ad-hoc  Networks (VANETs).  
Although,  standardization  bodies  such  as  IEEE  and  ETSI 
have adopted the pseudonymous scheme as a solution to this 
problem, an  efficient  pseudonym  changing  and  management 
is  still  an open  issue.  In  this  paper,  we  propose  a  complete 
and  efficient pseudonym  management  and  changing  scheme 
based on Vehicular  Location  Privacy  Zone  (VLPZ). We  define 
VLPZ as a roadside infrastructure designed to pseudonyms 
management and changing.  This  scheme  considers  that  the 
vehicular geographic area  is partitioned  as  a  grid,  where  each 
cell contains one or many VLPZs. The location privacy 
protection level provided by the  scheme  depends  on  the  VLPZ 
capacity  and  the  number  of vehicles that are inside it at the 
same time. For this reason, we also propose a reputation 
mechanism to stimulate vehicles to enter to the VLPZ, and finally 
evaluate the performances of the proposed scheme  using  Veins 
Framework  based  on  OMNet++  network simulator  and 
SUMO mobility. Simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness 
of the proposed scheme. 
Keywords—VANETs; Security; Location privacy; Pseudonym 
Changing; Pseudonym Management.. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On of the keys of a success deployment of Vehicular Ad- 
Hoc Networks (VANETs) is to consider the location privacy 
protection  of  their  users  [1].  A  common  approach  to 
avoid this  problem  is  that  vehicles  use  multiple  identifiers,  
called pseudonyms, instead of static identifiers in broadcasting 
safety messages.  Current  security  standards  such  as  IEEE 
1609.2 standard [2] and ETSI 102941-v1.1.1 [3] are based on 
a public key infrastructure (PKI), where the pseudonyms 
represent a set of certified public keys stored in the vehicle’s 
On-Board Unit (OBU). Vehicles can then periodically change 
their pseudonym to mitigate the tracking of their positions. 
The frequency of pseudonyms changing is then an important 
factor in the level of location privacy protection provided by 
this approach i.e. the higher frequency of pseudonyms 
changing  is,  the  more level of location privacy protection is 
provided. However, this frequency should not exceed a certain 
threshold to do not affect the communication performances 
[4]. In addition, the change of pseudonym should be 
accompanied by the change of the identifiers of all 
communication protocols stack layers such as the MAC and 
the IP addresses [5]. Although, this approach is adopted by 
both of the academia and the industry to be applied in the near 
future of VANETs’ deployment, several challenges are  still 
to  be  addressed  [6].  We  cite  for  example  that:  (i) several 
works  that  have  been  conducted  on  the  pseudonym 
changing  approach  efficiency  (e.g.  [7])  demonstrated  that, 
due  to  the  pseudonym  linking  attacks,  a  simple  changing 
of pseudonym is ineffective to provide the required level of 
location privacy protection for VANETs’ users. For this 
reason, several  pseudonym  changing  strategies  have  been 
proposed to provide an efficient pseudonym changing (e.g. [8] 
[9][10][11]). However, an effective strategy is still an open 
problem of  the  literature  [12],  (ii)  due  to  their  rationality 
behavior, vehicles  refuse  to  cooperate  by  changing  their 
pseudonyms simultaneously  with  other  vehicles  [13], 
which  has  a  negative  impact  on  the  privacy  protection 
level  provided  by  the pseudonym changing approach, and 
last but not least (iii) the existing  solutions  to  distribute  the 
pseudonyms  sets  and  the certificates (pseudonyms) 
revocation lists (CRLs) requires that the VANET area should 
totally be covered by Roadside Units (RSUs), which generates 
a high deployment costs and is hard to be achieved, especially 
in the first phase of the VANETs’ deployment [14]. 
To address these issues and in contrast to the existing 
works that  only  focus  on  one  (e.g.  [8] [13] [15])  or  some 
issues (e.g. [16][10])  of  the  pseudonym  changing  approach, 
this paper proposes a complete and efficient pseudonym 
changing and  management  scheme.  This  scheme  is  mainly 
based  on the Vehicular Location Privacy Zone (VLPZ). We 
define the VLPZ as a roadside infrastructure designed not only 
for the changing  of  pseudonyms  [17]  but  also  for  the 
management of  them.  VLPZ  can  easily  be  implemented  in 
the  existing roadside  infrastructures  such  as  gas  stations, 
electric  vehicles  charging  stations  and  toll  booths  or  new 
independent roadside infrastructures deployed for VANETs. 
The proposed scheme supports a synchronized changing of all 
identifiers of the communication stack layers and the user-
centric location privacy model. In addition, to well manage the 
pseudonyms, the proposed scheme considers that the vehicular 
geographic area is partitioned as a grid, where each cell 
contains one or many VLPZs. The location privacy protection 
depends on the capacity of the VLPZ and the number of 
vehicles that exist inside it at the same time. For this reason, 
we also propose a reputation mechanism to stimulate vehicles 
to enter to the VLPZ, and finally, evaluate the performance of 
the proposed scheme  using  Veins  Framework  that  is  based 
on  OMNet++ simulator and SUMO mobility engine. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 describes  some  related  work.  The  proposed 
pseudonym changing  and  managing  scheme  is  presented  in  
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Section  3.  Section 4 describes the reputation mechanism that 
is used to stimulate  vehicles  to  enter  to  the  VLPZ.  The  
performance evaluation  results  are  presented  in  Section  5.  
Finally,  the conclusion is given in Section 6. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Several  conducted  studies  have  been  demonstrated  that 
a  simple  pseudonym  changing  is  inefficient  to  provide  
the required privacy protection [7]. This is due to the 
pseudonyms linking attacks that can be classified into two 
categories [17]: (i)  the  syntactic  linking  of  pseudonyms:  
this  attack  can  be performed  if  there  is  no  
synchronization  in  changing  the pseudonyms between 
vehicles. Indeed, if the target is the only vehicle that changes 
its pseudonym among the vehicles that are running on the road 
at time t, the adversary can easily link the old and the new 
pseudonyms used by the vehicle, (ii) the semantic linking of 
pseudonyms: this attack can be performed even if the vehicles 
change their pseudonyms simultaneously. Indeed, by  
exploiting  the  information  included  in  safety messages and 
using some advanced tracking algorithms, the adversary can 
easily link the vehicle’s pseudonyms. To prevent such attacks, 
several pseudonym changing strategies have been proposed, 
which can be sorted in terms of their efficiency to prevent the 
pseudonyms linking attacks into three categories: (i)  
strategies  that  rely  only  on  a  mechanism  to  synchronize 
the changing of pseudonym processes between vehicles (e.g. 
[8][9]).  These  strategies  showed  their  weaknesses  against  
a passive adversary that uses the contents of the safety 
messages to link the pseudonyms using the semantic linking 
attack, (ii) strategies that propose to encrypt the safety 
messages for some periods  of  time  (e.g.  [10]).  These  
strategies  are  also  broken since it may exist some internal 
passive adversaries that have the decryption keys. Hence, the 
contents of the safety messages are disclosed to these 
adversaries, which can also provide a clue to  the external 
global  passive adversary to  perform the semantic linking of 
pseudonyms. In addition, decrypting these messages adds a 
processing latency, which may not meet with real-time 
requirements of safety-related applications [18], and finally 
(iii) strategies that use the radio silence technique (e.g. [11] ). 
The strategies of this category are more effective than the 
previous ones since they can provide the protection against 
both external and internal passive adversaries. However, using 
the  radio  silence  technique  in  VANETs  is  challenging  
since safety-related applications may get affected due of this 
[19].  
Besides of this, the cooperation of vehicles is a key factor 
in a successful pseudonym changing strategy. Rational 
vehicles tend to do not change their pseudonyms if they 
achieved their desired location privacy levels. This is due to 
the cost generated by pseudonym changing like the impact on 
geographic routing protocols [4]. [13] proposed a game-
theoretic based solution to change the pseudonym in a non-
cooperative environment. The authors developed  a  user-
centric privacy model, where vehicles change their  
pseudonyms  if  their  payoffs  will  be maximized after 
pseudonyms changing. However, this solution motivates  
vehicles  to  not  change  their  pseudonyms  if  they have 
achieved their desired location privacy levels, which has 
negative consequences on vehicles that do not have achieved 
their desired location privacy levels yet. In [10], the authors 
proposed DMPL (Dynamic Mix-Zone for Location Privacy) to 
dynamically create mix-zones: if a vehicle wants to create a 
mix zone, it sends a request to a strategy control server (CS); 
after receiving the request from the vehicle, the CS determines 
the length of the vehicle’s DMPL area and sends a command 
to all vehicles found in this area in order cooperate in creating 
vehicle’s DMPL. The authors also proposed a mechanism to 
stimulate  rational  vehicles  to  cooperate  on  creating  
DMPL. However,  this  strategy  is  vulnerable  to  the  
semantic  linking of pseudonyms and has many other 
drawbacks like the huge generated overhead. 
[16]  pointed  out  that  the  existing  solutions  have  only 
focused on how to provide an efficient pseudonym changing 
and  ignore  the  implementation  challenges  of  pseudonyms 
changing  approach.  For  this  purpose,  they  proposed  
RSUs- based scheme to generate and distribute pseudonym 
sets to the vehicles and an exchange of pseudonyms sets 
between RSUs mechanism to increase the anonymity. 
However, this scheme strongly depends on RSUs, which 
generates high deployment costs. In addition, it is still exposed 
to the semantic linking attack of pseudonyms. 
III. PSEUDONYM CHANGING AND MANAGEMENT 
SCHEME DESIGN 
   In  this  section,  we  present  the  design  of  the  proposed 
scheme. This section is structured as follows. We first describe 
the considered adversary model. We then present the system 
model,  the  VLPZ  model,  and  the  VLPZ-based  pseudonym 
changing  strategy.  After  that,  we  present  the  VLPZ-based 
pseudonyms sets and revocation lists distribution. Finally, we 
describe the used privacy evolution model and the mechanism 
of  generating  the  communication  layers  identifiers  from  
the pseudonym. 
A. Adversary Model 
   In this paper, we are interested to study the location privacy 
protection  against  a  strong  passive  adversary  model.  This 
adversary is composed of an external global passive adversary 
and few internal local passive attackers. It aims to track the 
target  vehicle  by  eavesdropping  all  communications  of  
any vehicle  within  a  region  of  interest.  The  adversary  
model  is well  aware  of  the  system  model  and  the  
proposed  scheme design. However, it has no control on the 
VLPZ. In addition, this adversary is not able to perform 
tracking using cameras, because the cost of the global 
eavesdropping with cameras is much  higher  than  the  radio-
based  eavesdropping.  Therefore, camera-based global 
eavesdropping is beyond the scope of this paper. 
B. System Model and assumptions 
   As  illustrated  in  Figure  1,  to  facilitate  the  management 
of pseudonyms  and  CRLs,  we  consider  that  the  vehicular 
geographic area is partitioned as a grid. The cells of the grid 
have  a  same  predefined  size.  Each  cell  may  comprise  the 
entire downtown area of a small town or few city blocks. The 
VANET system is composed of vehicles and Road-Side Units    
(RSUs).   
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Fig. 1.    An example of the proposed system model. 
 
Each  vehicle  has  an  OBU  device  that  is equipped with a 
wireless technology based on the IEEE 802.11p/WAVE 
standard. The OBU allows the vehicle not only to 
communicate with other vehicles but also with RSUs. Each 
vehicle is also equipped with a map and a GPS receiver that 
allows obtaining the position  and  the  current  time.  Each  
vehicle  periodically broadcasts a safety message every t 
milliseconds, where each message  includes  information  
about  the  vehicle  such  as  its position  and  its  speed.  We  
also  assume  the  existence  of  a central trusted authority 
(TA) that provides public and private keys to vehicles and 
RSUs. Before joining the VANET, each vehicle registers with 
the TA with its vehicle identifier, denoted by IDv . During the 
registration, each vehicle Vi is equipped with  a  public  and  a  
private  keys  and  sets  of  pseudonyms. Each  set  contains  n  
pseudonyms  Ki,j ,  where  j  ∈  1,...,  n. For  each  pseudonym  
Ki,j of  vehicle  Vi ,  the  TA  provides  a certificate  Certi,j (Ki,j 
).  The  private  key K  corresponding to the pseudonym Ki,j 
is used by the vehicle Vi to digitally sign messages. The 
pseudonym is attached to each message to enable other 
vehicles and RSUs to verify the sender’s authenticity.  Each  
vehicle  changes  its  pseudonym  each  δ  minutes. Each cell 
contains one regional trusted authority (TAR ), and one  or  
more  Vehicular  Privacy  Zones  (VLPZs).  TARs  act as  
intermediates  between  the  TA  and  the  VLPZs.  They  aim 
to  manage  the  pseudonyms  sets  and  the  CRLs  
distribution and control the location privacy protection level 
provided the VLPZs within the cells. Indeed, all the TARs are 
connected to the TA, and each TAR regional is contacted to 
the VLPZs within its cell via secure communication links. 
C. VLPZ Model 
   We define the Vehicular Location Privacy Zone (VLPZ) as a 
roadside infrastructure managed by trusted regional authorities 
like municipalities or directly by the country transportation 
department.  Each  cell  of  the  grid  can  contain  one  or  
more VLPZs.  The  VLPZ  aims  not  only  to  increase  the 
location privacy protection level of vehicles within the cell by 
providing an effective pseudonym changing [17], but also to 
distribute pseudonyms  sets  and  CRLs  to  them.  The design 
of  VLPZ is seemingly  similar  to  the  existing  roadside  
infrastructures like gas stations. As illustrated in the Figure 2, 
a basic VLPZ consists of one entry point called the router, one 
exit point called the aggregator and a limited number of lanes l 
where l > 1. Each VLPZ is equipped by an RSU denoted by 
RSUvz and used to: (i) periodically announce the existence of a 
VLPZ, (ii) stimulate vehicles passing through the VLPZ to 
enter, (iii) request  pseudonyms  sets  from  the  TAR and  
distribute  them to the vehicles inside the VLPZ according to 
their requests, (iv)  request  the  CRLs  from  the  TA R and  
distribute  them  to the vehicles inside the VPLZ, and finally 
(v) get information from vehicles, which helps the VLPZ to 
take certain decisions. The VLPZ can easily be implemented 
in the existing roadside infrastructures such as gas stations and 
toll booths. However, due to the increasing interest of users to 
protect their location privacy, we do not rule out that the 
VLPZ can be created as an independent roadside infrastructure 
in the future VANETs deployment.  VLPZs emplacements 
should be shown on the map to help vehicles to enter them, 
when it is needed. 
 
 
Fig. 2.    The VLPZ basic model 
D. VLPZ-based Pseudonym Changing Strategy 
   The  strategy  of  pseudonym  changing  is  executed  as  
follows[17].  The  RSUvz periodically  broadcasts  
notifications to  inform  the  vehicles  that  are  passing  
through  a  VLPZ  its existence. If a vehicle wants to access to 
the VLPZ, it sends a  request  to  the  RSUvz.  As  Figure  2  
shows  vehicles  arrive to  a  VLPZ,  one  after  another,  on  a  
one-lane.  They  keep broadcasting safety messages until they 
enter the VLPZ. When a  vehicle  reaches  the  router,  it  stops  
broadcasting  safety messages and heads for an assigned 
VLPZ’s lane. The assigned lane  is  randomly  and  privately  
selected  by  the  router.  The vehicle  can  then  reside  inside  
a  VLPZ  for  a  random  period of time. This period mainly 
depends on the service time. For example, if we assume that a 
VLPZ is implemented in a gas station, the service time is the 
time taken by the driver to fill the fuel tank of its vehicle. A 
vehicle must change its pseudonym before it exits the VLPZ 
and all vehicles exit a VLPZ through the aggregator. However, 
the exit order is different from the entering order since the 
residency periods of vehicles are random. We also assume that 
the aggregator can intervene to select a certain order in 
random and private way. As discussed in [17], this strategy 
provides the protection not only against both of the syntactic 
and the semantic linking of pseudonyms, but also against the 
FIFO attacks. In addition, differently from the strategies that 
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rely on the radio silence technique, the road safety is preserved 
in this strategy. 
E. Pseudonyms Sets and Revocation Lists Distribution 
   In contrast to the existing solutions that rely only on RSUs 
that are spread over roads to distribute pseudonyms sets (e.g. 
[16]) and pseudonyms revocation lists (CRLs) (e.g. [20]), we 
propose in this paper that the distribution of pseudonyms sets 
and CRLs is performed inside the VLPZ and the RSUvzs are 
the  only  roadside  units  that  are  used  for  this  purpose.  
This helps  to  reduce  the  number  of  required  RSUs  to  
carry  out these operations, which significantly reduces the 
deployment costs.  However,  on  the  one  hand,  the  CRLs  
should  quickly and  widely  be  distributed  in  order  to  
provide  a  reasonable revocation time. On the other hand, as 
the demand of vehicles in terms of pseudonyms is permanent, 
vehicles should be able to refill pseudonym sets each time 
they require them.  For these reasons, we propose that 
vehicles: (i) can exchange small CRLs updates through V2V 
communications. A method like [20]  can  be  used  for  this  
purpose,  (ii)  can  be  involved  in the distribution of 
pseudonyms sets [21]. In order to request new  pseudonyms  
sets,  the  vehicle  sends  a  request,  which includes its 
identifier (IDv ), to the RSUvz . This request will immediately 
be forwarded to the TAR . When a TAR receives such  request,  
it  first  checks  if  it  has  enough  number  of pseudonym sets 
to satisfy the demand of the vehicle. If this is the case, TAR 
sends back the requested pseudonyms sets to the RSUvz . Else, 
the TAR forwards the request to the TA that will satisfy the 
demand as soon as it receives the request. In the same the way, 
the pseudonyms sets will be sent back to TAR and from it to 
the RSUvz . Finally, the RSUvz sends the requested 
pseudonyms sets to the vehicle as soon as receives them. All 
exchanges between vehicles and the RSUvz should be 
encrypted in order prevent the adversary to get access to these 
messages. We still mention that the pseudonyms sets are 
generated by the TA and distributed to the TARs according to 
their estimations of the number of required pseudonyms sets in 
each cell. 
F. Privacy Level Evolution 
    The location privacy level of a vehicle changes over the 
time. It can decrease due to the pseudonym linking attacks and 
increase each time that a vehicle enters to a VLPZ. To capture 
the  evolution  that  occurs  to  the  location  privacy  level  of  
ma vehicle over time, we adapt the user-centric location 
privacy model  introduced  by  [13].  The  location  privacy  
level  of  a vehicle  i  is  modeled  using  a  location  privacy  
loss function ( , ): (ℝ , ℝ ) → ℝ 	where t is the current 
time and  ≤ t is the time of the last pseudonym change of 
vehicle i inside a VLPZ. The privacy loss is set to 0, each time 
that i  changes  its  pseudonym  inside  a  VLPZ  and  
increases  with time according to a sensitivity parameter, 0 < λ  < 1 until it reaches a maximum value  ( ), which is the 
location privacy protection level achieved at last pseudonym 
change of vehicle i inside a VLPZ. The privacy loss function  
is defined as follows: 
 
 
 
Where =	 	 ( 	)	  is the time when the function  
reaches  the  maximal  privacy  loss.  The location  privacy 
level of vehicle i at time t is : 
 
 
 
Figure  3  illustrates  the  evolution  of  the  location  privacy 
level of a vehicle i. Its privacy level (Ai (t)) is initially equal to 
0 and its desired location privacy level is Ad . The vehicle is 
then looking to enter to a VLPZ each time when its location 
privacy is below than its desired level. For this reason, it 
enters to a VLPZ at times t1, t2, and t3. However, at t4, i 
enters to a VLPZ, although its location privacy level is greater 
than the desired level. This is because the vehicle enters to 
cooperate with other vehicles  to  increase  their  location  
privacy levels. This is due the proposed reputation mechanism 
described in Section 4. 
 
 
Fig. 3.   Evolution of the location privacy level of a vehicle i over 
time. 
G. Generating The Communication Layers Identifiers 
   In  order  to  prevent  the  pseudonyms  linking  attack,  the 
change of pseudonym should be accompanied by the change 
of the identifiers of all communication stack layers such as the 
MAC  and  the  IP  addresses  [5].  In  this  scheme,  we  
propose that  vehicles  use  the  Cryptographically  Generated  
Address (CGA)  protocol  [22]  to  generate  the  IP  addresses  
from  the pseudonyms  and  to  generate  the  MAC  addresses  
from  the generated  IP  addresses.  As  described  in  [23],  
CGA  uses  a pseudonym  (public  key)  and  a  random  128-
bit  number  to generate  the  interface  identifier,  which  is  
concatenated  with a  subnet  prefix  to  build  an  IPv6  
address.  The  concept  of CGA can also be used to generate a 
MAC address from the pseudonym. Indeed, [16] proposed to 
generate the hash value of (Random 128-bit number || Subnet 
prefix || Collision count || Public Key || Extension fields). The 
collision count and the extension are described in [23]. 
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IV. MOTIVATING VEHICLES TO ENTER TO THE VLPZ 
The location privacy protection level provided by a VLPZ 
mainly  depends  on  its  capacity  and  its  occupancy  i.e.  the 
number of vehicles inside it at the same time. The capacity of 
the VLPZ, denoted by K, is a static parameter that can be set 
by the system designer. However, the occupancy of the VLPZ, 
denoted  by  |AS|t,  can  be  impacted  by  several  parameters. 
First,  the  number  of  vehicles  that  request  to  enter  to  the 
VLPZ definitively depends on the road traffic density i.e. 
more vehicles exist on the road, more vehicles enter to the 
VLPZ. In addition, in this paper, we assume that vehicles are 
rational. In  other  words,  they  look  to  ensure  their  location  
privacy protection  with  a  minimum  possible  cost,  which  
represents the cost taken by a vehicle to move to a VLPZ. This 
cost can be expressed by the time to reach the VLPZ and 
quantified by  the  lost  of  pseudonyms  during  this  time.  
Therefore,  if  a vehicle  have  reached  its  desired  location  
privacy  protection level (Ad ), it will not look to enter a VLPZ 
again to cooperate with other vehicles to increase their 
location privacy protection levels, until its privacy protection 
level goes under Ad . For this reason, we assume that the 
VLPZ uses a reputation system to increase its occupancy. The 
VLPZ then broadcasts invitation requests to motivate the 
vehicles to enter to the VLPZ. If a vehicle positively responds 
to enter to the VLPZ, its reputation value will then increase. 
However, if a vehicle refuses to enter to the VLPZ, its 
reputation value will decrease. The increase or the decrease of 
the reputation value depends on the VLPZ occupancy at tj, 
where tj is time when the vehicle exits the VLPZ, if the 
vehicle accepts the jth invitation of the VLPZ or  the  time  
when  the  vehicle  receives  the  invitation,  if  the vehicle  
refuses  the  invitation.  The reputation value  ℝ  of a given 
vehicle i after jth invitation is then given by following formula. 
 
 
 
Where ℝ 	is the old reputation value of vehicle i. The 
reputation value  of  the  vehicle  increases  as  much  as it 
cooperates. The accumulated reputation value is then used by 
the vehicle when it needs to access to the VLPZ.  
As  described  in  Algorithm  1,  when  the  VLPZ  receives 
a  request  to  access  from  a  vehicle  i,  it  first  checks  if  the 
reputation value of i is above or equals to a certain threshold, 
denoted  by  ω.  If  this  is  the  case,  the  VLPZ  then  accepts 
i  to  enter  to  the  VLPZ.  Else,  the  VLPZ  checks  if  i  has 
already  refused  an  invitation  from  a  VLPZ.  The  reason  
of this  second  check  is  to  verify  if  the  vehicle  does  not  
have already an opportunity of cooperation. Indeed, the VLPZ 
can get this information directly from the TA, which is 
connected to all VLPZs. If the VLPZ finds that i has already 
refused an invitation from a given VLPZ, i is detected as a 
selfish and the VLPZ refuses the access to i . Else, the VLPZ 
accepts the request of i. The vehicle then always tries to keep 
its reputation value above ω, which stimulates it to cooperate 
more when it receives an invitation from the VLPZ. We 
mention that if the VLPZ  is  implemented  at  an  existing  
roadside  infrastructure like a gas station, refusing access to 
the VLPZ means that the vehicle will enter to the 
infrastructure and will not execute the VLPZ-based strategy 
and request new pseudonyms sets. We also mention that 
during the registration, the TA gives to each vehicle a 
reputation value above to ω, which allows the vehicle to enter 
to the VLPZ at the beginning. In addition, each time that the 
vehicle exits a VLPZ, its reputation value will be set to 0. 
 
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
   In  order  to  evaluate  the  performances  of  the  proposed 
scheme, we performed a set of simulations. These simulations 
are conducted using Veins Simulation Framework [24]. Veins 
is  an  inter-vehicular  communication  simulation  framework 
based on OMNet++  bi-directionally coupled with SUMO 
road traffic simulation [25]. OMNet++ and SUMO run in 
parallel and communicate via a TCP socket. The reason of 
choosing Veins  is  its  ability  to  simulation  full  802.11p  
and  IEEE 1609.4 DSRC/WAVE network layers. Table I 
summarizes the parameters considered in our simulations. 
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Fig. 4.  The evaluation of the location privacy level of vehicles over 
time. 
 
The  considered  scenario  represents  a  simple  road  course 
that has a rectangle shape of dimensions 3km x 1.5km. We 
have installed a VLPZ on one side of this road course. The 
vehicles were generated using SUMO to take repeated turns of 
30 min duration on this road course. The privacy level values 
and the reputation values of vehicles are initialized according 
to a normal distribution N  (µ,σ) with a mean equal to µ = 5 
and with a standard deviation equals to σ = 5/3. In addition, 
as shown in Table I, the desired levels of all vehicles and their 
sensitivity parameters are assumed equals. In our evaluation, 
we run simulation several times with different random seeds 
and calculate the average value with 95% confidence interval. 
Figure 4 illustrates of the evolution of the location privacy 
protection  levels  of  vehicles  over  time  both  when  using  
the baseline  version  of  the  scheme  and  when  using  the  
scheme with the reputation mechanism. We can see in the 
Figure 4(a) that  using  the  baseline  version,  the  average  of  
privacy  protection  levels  still  stable  over  time  and  more  
that  30%  of vehicles still have privacy protection levels 
under the desired level (Ad ) over time. However, as illustrated 
in Figure 4(b), when the reputation mechanism is used, the 
average privacy protection levels gradually increase and at 
time 30 min, only 2% of vehicles still have privacy protection 
levels under the desired location  privacy  level  (Ad ),  which  
demonstrates the efficiency of the proposed reputation 
mechanism. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.    The anonymity set size frequency over time. 
 
 
 
 
In  Figures  5  and  6,  we  evaluate  the  location  privacy 
protection  level  provided  by  the  VLPZ  over  time.  In  our 
evaluation, we use two well-known privacy metrics: the size 
of the anonymity set and the degree of anonymity. The 
anonymity set (AS) defined as the set of vehicles that are 
indistinguishable from  the  target  with  the  set  including  the  
target  itself.  At a  VLPZ,  the  anonymity  set  actually  
includes  the  target  and all vehicles inside a VLPZ. The size 
of the anonymity set is then the number of vehicles that the 
anonymity set includes. The capacity of the VLPZ (K) is the 
maximum value of the anonymity set size that could be taken 
by a vehicle when it enters  to  a  VLPZ.  The  degree  of  
anonymity  is  the  normalized  value  of  the  level  of  privacy  
protection  level  achieved compared  to  the  maximum  
privacy  protection  level  that  can be achieved [26]. The 
anonymity degree (d) is given by the following formula: 
 
Figure  5  compares  the  frequency  of  the  anonymity  set 
size over the simulation period between baseline scheme and 
the  scheme  using  the  reputation  mechanism  (ω  =  K/2).  It 
shows  that  the  number  of  times  that  the  anonymity  set  
size achieves high values increase when the reputation 
mechanism is  used,  which  has  a  positive  impact  on  the   
 
 
 
Fig. 6.    The degree of anonymity over time. 
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degree  of  the anonymity provided by the VLPZ. Indeed, 
Figure 6 compares between the degree of anonymity of 
baseline scheme and the scheme  using  the  reputation  
mechanism, where ω takes  the following  values  
respectively:  K/4,  K/2.  The  Figure  shows that  comparing  
to  baseline  scheme,  the  mean  of  the  degree of anonymity 
increases for more than 0.1 using the reputation mechanism. In 
addition, the mean of the degree of anonymity slightly 
increases using the threshold reputation value ω equals to K/2 
instead of k/4. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
  In   this   paper,   we   proposed   a   complete   and   efficient 
pseudonym changing and managing scheme for vehicular ad-
hoc  networks.  This  scheme  is  mainly  based  on  the  
VLPZ, which is a roadside infrastructure designed for the 
changing and  the  management  of  pseudonyms  and  can  
easily  be  implemented  in  the  existing  roadside  
infrastructures.  We  also proposed  a  reputation  mechanism  
to  simulate  vehicles  to enter to the VLPZs. As a future 
works, we will develop the communication protocols that will 
be used in this scheme, and propose a stochastic model to 
predict the optimal number of VLPZs required in a given cell 
over time. In addition, we will carry out a simulation study 
using a real map with real traffic mobility measurements. 
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